The Ottoman and Habsburg Empires both faced the "general crisis" of the 17 th century. Yet they responded to the crisis very differently. The Habsburgs centralized fiscal structures, which would facilitate economic development in the 19th century. The Ottomans, which initially had more centralized tax collection, opted for decentralization, paving the way for economic peripheralization. To account for this puzzle, this book offers a political-economic theory of institutional change that focuses on the structure and intensity of elite conflict over the distribution of resources. Using the comparative-historical method, the book demonstrates that high levels of conflict generated political incentives for centralization, and where such incentives were lacking, decentralization followed.

lgrsnf/Economic Crisis, Elite Conflict and Institutional Change in Empires [AN 3586763].pdf

Germany, Germany

New York, 2023

Berlin, 2023

Cover
Dedication
Acknowledgment
Table of Contents
Chapter 1 Introduction
1. The Puzzle: The Reversal of Fortunes
2. Theory, Data, and Methodology
3. Contributions
Chapter 2 Elite Conflict, Political Coalitions, and Institutional Change
1. The Seventeenth-Century Crisis
1.1 “The General Crisis”
1.2 The Costs of Warfare
1.3 Divergent Responses to the Crisis
2. Existing Theories and Their Limitations
2.1 Macro-structural Theories
2.1.1 Culture
2.1.2 Economy
2.1.3 Warfare
2.2 Coalitional Theories
3. Intra-Elite Conflict and Institutional Change
3.1 Definitions, Assumptions, and Mechanisms
3.2 Main Arguments
4. Conclusion
Chapter 3 Intra-Elite Conflict in the Habsburg Empire, 1278-1660
1. The Origins of Intra-Elite Relations in the Habsburg Empire
1.1 Horizontal Empire
1.2 Administration by the Estates and Royal Reforms in the Sixteenth Century
1.2.1 Bohemia
1.2.2 The Slovene Lands
1.2.3 Hungary
2. The Changes in the Structure of Intra-Elite Relations
2.1 Shifts in the European Economy and Monopolization of Agricultural Lands
2.2 The High-Intensity Intra-Elite Conflict
3. Conclusion
Chapter 4 Elite Realignment and Institutional Change in the Habsburg Empire, 1660-1848
1. The Realignment and Incorporation of the Capital
2. Building the Fiscal State
3. Reforms in Agriculture, Trade, and Manufacturing
4. The Legacy of State Formation
5. Conclusion
Chapter 5 Intra-Elite Conflict in the Ottoman Empire, 1299-1600
1. The Origins of Intra-Elite Relations in the Ottoman Empire
1.1 Vertical Empire
1.2 Central Administration
2. The Changes in the Structure of Intra-Elite Relations
2.1 Unified Elites
2.2 Central Elite and Urban Capital Holders
2.3 Effects of the Seventeenth-Century Crisis on the Elite Conflict
3. Conclusion
Chapter 6 Elite Realignment and Institutional Change in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1881
1. Elite Response to the Fiscal Crisis
2. The Coalition of the Bureaucratic Elite and the Tax Farmers
3. Commercialization of Agriculture and the Rise of Export-Oriented Landlords
4. Intensification of Intra-Elite Conflict and Failed Capital Incorporation
5. Conclusion
Chapter 7 Conclusion
1. Revisiting the Arguments
2. Contribution to the Literature
2.1 Demand- and Supply-Side in Institutional Change
2.2 The Question of “East vs. West”
Bibliography

The Ottoman and Habsburg Empires both faced the "general crisis" of the 17th century. Yet they responded to the crisis very differently. The Habsburgs centralized fiscal structures, which would facilitate economic development in the 19th century. The Ottomans, which initially had more centralized tax collection, opted for decentralization, paving the way for economic peripheralization. To account for this puzzle, this book offers a political-economic theory of institutional change that focuses on the structure and intensity of elite conflict over the distribution of resources. Using the comparative-historical method, the book demonstrates that high levels of conflict generated political incentives for centralization, and where such incentives were lacking, decentralization followed.
Erscheinungsdatum: 27.03.2023

The book offers an innovative theory of institutional change. The empirical analysis is based on the comparison of two critical cases, the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires. The main finding is that the variation in long-term institutional outcomes in these two cases can be explained by the differences in the structure and intensity of elite conflict.

2024-04-30