The problems arising from the existence of asymmetric information in public decision making have been widely explored by economists. Most of the traditional analysis of public sector activities has been reviewed to take accountofthe possible distortions arising from an asymmetric distribution of relevant information among the actors of the public decision-making process. A normative approach has been developed to design incentive schemes which tackle adverse selection and moral hazard problems within public organisations: our understanding of these problems is now much better, and some of the mechanisms designed have had important practical implications. While this analysis is still under way in many fields of public economics, as the papers by Jones and Zanola, and Trimarchi witness, a debate is ongoing on the possible theoretical limitations ofthis approach and on its actual relevance for public sector activities. This book encompasses different contributions to these issues, on both theoretical and practical areas, which were firstly presented at a conference in Catania. The innermost problem in the current discussion arises from the fact that this normative analysis is firmly rooted in the complete contracting framework, with the consequence that, despite the analytical complexities of most models, their results rely on very simplified assumptions. Most complexities of the organisation of public sector, and more generally, of writing "contracts", are therefore swept away.
Erscheinungsdatum: 30.11.2000

lgrsnf/A:\compressed\10.1007%2F978-1-4615-1583-8.pdf

nexusstc/Public Decision-Making Processes and Asymmetry of Information/88d873dfceb16e8f090423ee24b02509.pdf

zlib/Business & Economics/Jean-Jacques Laffont (auth.), Massimo Marrelli, Giacomo Pignataro (eds.)/Public Decision-Making Processes and Asymmetry of Information_2132621.pdf

edited by Massimo Marrelli and Giacomo Pignataro

Kluwer Academic Publishers

Springer London, Limited

United States, United States of America

Springer Nature, New York, NY, 2012

Boston, Massachusetts, 2001

1 edition, November 2000

New York, Oct. 2012

New York, NY, 2000

Boston [u.a, 2001

2001, 2012

2001, 2000

lg978698

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Includes bibliographical references and index

<p><P>The issue of asymmetric information and public decision-making has been widely explored by economists. Most of the traditional analysis of public sector activities has been reviewed to take account of the different incentive problems arising from an asymmetric distribution of relevant information among the actors of the public decision-making process. A normative approach has been developed, mainly employing the principal agent paradigm to design incentive schemes which tackle adverse selection and moral hazard problems within public organizations. Still, this analysis is under way in many fields of public economics. <br> However, a debate is ongoing on the theoretical limitations of this approach and on its relevance for the actual public sector activities. Public Decision-Making Processes and Asymmetry of Information encompasses different contributions to these issues, on both theoretical and practical areas. <br> The innermost problem in the current discussion arises from the fact that this normative analysis is firmly rooted in the complete contracting framework, with the consequence that, despite the analytical complexities of most models, their results rely on very simplified assumptions. Most complexities of the organization of public sector, and more generally, of writing "contracts", are therefore swept away. Once the need for an incomplete contracting approach is recognized, the question becomes how to relax some of the assumptions characterizing the complete contracting framework, without getting ad hoc results. The Introduction to this book, written by Jean Jacques Laffont, sets the general grid to interpret the position of its papers in this debate. <br> The four papers in Part 1 of the book are devoted to developing the analysis of some of the theoretical issues mentioned in the Introduction. Part 2 is devoted to discussing the applications of the theory to different public sector activities.</p>

The problems arising from the existence of asymmetric information in public decision making have been widely explored by economists. Most of the traditional analysis of public sector activities has been reviewed to take accountofthe possible distortions arising from an asymmetric distribution of relevant information among the actors of the public decision-making process. A normative approach has been developed to design incentive schemes which tackle adverse selection and moral hazard problems within public organisations: our understanding of these problems is now much better, and some of the mechanisms designed have had important practical implications. While this analysis is still under way in many fields of public economics, as the papers by Jones and Zanola, and Trimarchi witness, a debate is ongoing on the possible theoretical limitations ofthis approach and on its actual relevance for public sector activities. This book encompasses different contributions to these issues, on both theoretical and practical areas, which were firstly presented at a conference in Catania. The innermost problem in the current discussion arises from the fact that this normative analysis is firmly rooted in the complete contracting framework, with the consequence that, despite the analytical complexities of most models, their results rely on very simplified assumptions. Most complexities of the organisation of public sector, and more generally, of writing "contracts", are therefore swept away.
Erscheinungsdatum: 21.10.2012

Front Matter....Pages i-xv
The Economics of Information and Public Policy....Pages 1-13
Front Matter....Pages 15-15
Industrial Policy, Optimal Majorities and How These Can Prevent Capture....Pages 17-35
On the Role of Lobbies in Policy Making....Pages 37-66
Delegated Control of Incentives in Regulated Industries....Pages 67-87
Firms, Unions and Regulators....Pages 89-107
Front Matter....Pages 109-109
Implementation Practices in Regulation....Pages 111-146
Public Procurement in the EU....Pages 147-164
Agency and Health Care....Pages 165-188
Incentive Failure and The Market for Information Goods....Pages 189-202
Back Matter....Pages 203-206

Until recently public policy was designed by economists within the paradigm of an informed benevolent social maximiser.

2013-08-01