The ancient philosophical school of Epicureanism tried to argue that death is ''nothing to us.'' Were they right? James Warren examines the arguments they offered and evaluates their success, setting them against modern philosophical accounts of how death can be a harm. He also asks whether a life free from all fear of death is an attractive option and what the consequences would be of a full acceptance of the Epicureans' views.

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nexusstc/Facing Death/a0a9f6a520b53b5a43dd5e73427e0d88.pdf

zlib/Society, Politics & Philosophy/Anthropology/James Warren/Facing Death: Epicurus and His Critics_943113.pdf

Warren, James

IRL Press at Oxford University Press

Oxford University Press Academic UK

Oxford Institute for Energy Studies

German Historical Institute London

Oxford University Press, USA

CLARENDON/OXFORD

Clarendon Press

United Kingdom and Ireland, United Kingdom

Oxford University Press USA, Oxford, 2004

Oxford, New York, England, 2004

OXFORD, Unknown

Oxford, 2006

2, 20040617

PS, 2006

1, 2004

до 2011-01

lg518593

{"isbns":["0191531006","0199252890","019929769X","9780191531002","9780199252893","9780199297696"],"last_page":256,"publisher":"Oxford University Press"}

Includes bibliographical references (p. [223]-232) and indexes.

<p><P>The ancient philosophical school of Epicureanism tried to argue that death is nothing to us. Were they right? James Warren provides a comprehensive study and articulation of the interlocking arguments against the fear of death found not only in the writings of Epicurus himself, but also in Lucretius' poem <b>De rerum natura</b> and in Philodemus' work <b>De morte</b>. These arguments are central to the Epicurean project of providing <b>ataraxia</b> (freedom from anxiety) and therefore central to an understanding of Epicureanism as a whole. They also offer significant resources for modern discussions of the value of death&#151;one which stands at the intersection of metaphysics and ethics. If death is the end of the subject, and the subject can not be benefited nor harmed after death, is it reasonable nevertheless to fear the ceasing-to-be? If the Epicureans are not right to claim that the dead can neither be benefited nor harmed, what alternative models might be offered for understanding the harm done by death and do these alternatives suffer from any further difficulties? The discussion involves consideration of both ethical and metaphysical topics since it requires analysis not only of the nature of a good life but also the nature of personal identity and time. A number of modern philosophers have offered criticisms or defences of the Epicureans' views. Warren explores and evaluates these in the light of a systematic and detailed study of the precise form and intention of the Epicureans' original arguments.<P>Warren argues that the Epicureans also were interested in showing that mortality is not to be regretted and that premature death is not to be feared. Their arguments for these conclusions are to be found in their positive conception of the nature of a good and complete life, which divorce the completeness of a life as far as possible from considerations of its duration. Later chapters investigate the nature of a life lived without the fear of death and pose serious problems for the Epicureans being able to allow any concern for the post mortem future and being able to offer a positive reason for prolonging a life which is already complete in their terms.</p>

The ancient philosophical school of Epicureanism tried to argue that death is 'nothing to us'. Were they right? James Warren provides a comprehensive study and articulation of the interlocking arguments against the fear of death found not only in the writings of Epicurus himself, but also in Lucretius' poem De rerum natura and in Philodemus' work De morte. These arguments are central to the Epicurean project of providing ataraxia (freedom from anxiety) and therefore central to an understanding of Epicureanism as a whole. They also offer significant resources for modern discussions of the value of death - one which stands at the intersection of metaphysics and ethics. If death is the end of the subject, and the subject can not be benefited nor harmed after death, is it reasonable nevertheless to fear the ceasing-to-be? If the Epicureans are not right to claim that the dead can neither be benefited nor harmed, what alternative models might be offered for understanding the harm done by death and do these alternatives suffer from any further difficulties? The discussion involves consideration of both ethical and metaphysical topics since it requires analysis not only of the nature of a good life but also the nature of personal identity and time. A number of modern philosophers have offered criticisms or defences of the Epicureans' views. Warren explores and evaluates these in the light of a systematic and detailed study of the precise form and intention of the Epicureans' original arguments. Warren argues that the Epicureans also were interested in showing that mortality is not to be regretted and that premature death is not to be feared. Their arguments for these conclusions are to be found in their positive conception of the nature of a good and complete life, which divorce the completeness of a life as far as possible from considerations of its duration. Later chapters investigate the nature of a life lived without the fear of death and pose serious problems for the Epicureans being able to allow any concern for the post mortem future and being able to offer a positive reason for prolonging a life which is already complete in their terms.

A comprehensive study and articulation of the interlocking Epicurean arguments against the fear of death found not only in the writings of Epicurus himself but also in Lucretius' poem De Rerum Natura and in Philodemus' work De Morte. These arguments are central to the Epicurean project of providing ataraxia (tranquillity, freedom from anxiety) and therefore central to an understanding of Epicureanism as a whole

The ancient philosophical school of Epicureanism tried to argue that death is 'nothing to us'. Were they right? This book examines the arguments they offered and evaluates their success, setting them against modern philosophical accounts of how death can be a harm. It also asks whether a life free from all fear of death is an attractive option.

James Warren examines and evaluates the argument that death is 'nothing to us'. He sets this against modern philosophical accounts of how death can be a harm and asks whether a life free from all fear of death is an attractive option and what the consequences would be of a full acceptance of the Epicureans' views

Fears of death
Death and deprivation
Symmetry arguments
Premature death and a complete life
Living an Epicurean life.

2011-06-04