《乌合之众:群体时代的大众心理》为群体心理学奠基之作。《乌合之众:群体时代的大众心理》为精装插图收藏版,包括大量现实主义讽刺画大师杜米埃的精彩作品!《乌合之众:群体时代的大众心理》深入浅出地剖析了群体的种种特点及其成因,深入透视了社会服从和过度服从、群众的反叛、大众文化、受别人支配的自我、群众运动、人的自我异化、官僚化过程以及无意识在社会行为中的作用。《乌合之众:群体时代的大众心理》受到了弗洛伊德、罗斯福、戴高乐、丘吉尔、梁启超、梁启勋、周作人等人的赞誉和推崇,尽管语言辛辣、观点,但我们依旧可以从中感受到天才般的洞见,从而让我们从心理学的角度更好地理解历史和当今的社会现象和事件,助我们看透互联网转型时代的权力、消费和关系。

《乌合之众:群体时代的大众心理》为群体心理学奠基之作。《乌合之众:群体时代的大众心理》为精装插图收藏版,包括大量现实主义讽刺画大师杜米埃的精彩作品!《乌合之众:群体时代的大众心理》深入浅出地剖析了群体的种种特点及其成因,深入透视了社会服从和过度服从、群众的反叛、大众文化、受别人支配的自我、群众运动、人的自我异化、官僚化过程以及无意识在社会行为中的作用。《乌合之众:群体时代的大众心理》受到了弗洛伊德、罗斯福、戴高乐、丘吉尔、梁启超、梁启勋、周作人等人的赞誉和推崇,尽管语言辛辣、观点,但我们依旧可以从中感受到天才般的洞见,从而让我们从心理学的角度更好地理解历史和当今的社会现象和事件,助我们看透互联网转型时代的权力、消费和关系。

《乌合之众:群体时代的大众心理》为群体心理学奠基之作。《乌合之众:群体时代的大众心理》为精装插图收藏版,包括大量现实主义讽刺画大师杜米埃的精彩作品!《乌合之众:群体时代的大众心理》深入浅出地剖析了群体的种种特点及其成因,深入透视了社会服从和过度服从、群众的反叛、大众文化、受别人支配的自我、群众运动、人的自我异化、官僚化过程以及无意识在社会行为中的作用。《乌合之众:群体时代的大众心理》受到了弗洛伊德、罗斯福、戴高乐、丘吉尔、梁启超、梁启勋、周作人等人的赞誉和推崇,尽管语言辛辣、观点,但我们依旧可以从中感受到天才般的洞见,从而让我们从心理学的角度更好地理解历史和当今的社会现象和事件,助我们看透互联网转型时代的权力、消费和关系。

古斯塔夫・勒庞 Gustave Le Bon(1841-1931) 法国著名社会心理学家。他自1894年始,写下一系列社会心理学著作,以本书最为著名,被 翻译成近二十种语言,至今仍在国际学术界有广泛影响。

《乌合之众:群体时代的大众心理》为群体心理学奠基之作。《乌合之众:群体时代的大众心理》为精装插图收藏版,包括大量现实主义讽刺画大师杜米埃的精彩作品!《乌合之众:群体时代的大众心理》深入浅出地剖析了群体的种种特点及其成因,深入透视了社会服从和过度服从、群众的反叛、大众文化、受别人支配的自我、群众运动、人的自我异化、官僚化过程以及无意识在社会行为中的作用。《乌合之众:群体时代的大众心理》受到了弗洛伊德、罗斯福、戴高乐、丘吉尔、梁启超、梁启勋、周作人等人的赞誉和推崇,尽管语言辛辣、观点,但我们依旧可以从中感受到天才般的洞见,从而让我们从心理学的角度更好地理解历史和当今的社会现象和事件,助我们看透互联网转型时代的权力、消费和关系。

《乌合之众:群体时代的大众心理》为群体心理学奠基之作。《乌合之众:群体时代的大众心理》为精装插图收藏版,包括大量现实主义讽刺画大师杜米埃的精彩作品!《乌合之众:群体时代的大众心理》深入浅出地剖析了群体的种种特点及其成因,深入透视了社会服从和过度服从、群众的反叛、大众文化、受别人支配的自我、群众运动、人的自我异化、官僚化过程以及无意识在社会行为中的作用。《乌合之众:群体时代的大众心理》受到了弗洛伊德、罗斯福、戴高乐、丘吉尔、梁启超、梁启勋、周作人等人的赞誉和推崇,尽管语言辛辣、观点,但我们依旧可以从中感受到天才般的洞见,从而让我们从心理学的角度更好地理解历史和当今的社会现象和事件,助我们看透互联网转型时代的权力、消费和关系。

Like its predecessor in this series, Adam Smith and Modern Sociology, the present book is a mere fragment. It deals with a single factor of the social process in the German States. It finds this factor already effective in 1555. It does not attempt to trace each link in the chain of continuity from that date. It reviews the most important seventeenth-century writers in the line of sequence, but the emphasis of the book falls in the eighteenth century. I have carefully excluded the problem of relations between this literary factor and other social elements, and I have purposely refrained from estimating its ratio of importance among the formative forces of the period. Conclusions of that order must come from a larger synthesis, for which the present study supplies merely a detail. To justify my belief that the labor which this book cost was well spent, it would be necessary to prove first, that Americans have much to gain from better understanding of the Germans; and second, that just appreciation of the present social system of the Germans is impossible for Americans unless they are willing to trace it historically. These propositions must be left, however, without the support of argument, merely as the author's profession of faith. To readers of English only, cameralism is virtually a lost chapter in the history of the social sciences. Although everything now belonging to German polity has a part of its heredity in that type of social theory, not every reputable student of the social sciences in America could correctly define the term, and few could name more than one or two writers to whom it is properly applied. In a word, the cameralists were a series of German writers, from the middle of the sixteenth to the end of the eighteenth century, who approached civic problems from a common viewpoint, who proposed the same central question, and who developed a coherent civic theory, corresponding with the German system of administration at the same time in course of evolution. To the cameralists the central problem of science was the problem of the state. To them the object of all social theory was to Albion Small, The Cameralists, 35 to cite only a few details in which he has thrown light upon Osse. In the first place, Thomasius says, in the Preface to the document, that he was first shown the imperfect manuscript, (apparently in 1707) in the Fürstliche Bibliothck at Wolffen-büttel. He adds that up to that time it was unknown to him, and he had not even seen the portions that had been printed. Later he bought the full manuscript at an auction. Thomasius appears to have recognized in Osse a man after his own heart. Replying to the supposed challenge, Why publish the book of a man about whom so many suspicions existed? he says (Vorrede, p. 16): The author is the first of those counselors known to us who gave their opinion as to the way in which the judicial system is to be improved. The first usually breaks the ice, and cannot accomplish all, but he leaves the rest to his successors. The document as we have it occupies, with the editor's notes, 548 pages. In the same binding, and filling 264 pages, is Thomasius' collection of materials on the history of the University of Leipzig. The title of the collection is Ein kleiner Versitch von Annalibus. The editing of Osse's work was in Thomasius'mind a propagandist measure, and as he regarded improvement of the educational system as the key to the whole problem, it was appropriate to issue the seemingly unlike documents together. It appears that Thomasius wanted to publish a treatise on political reform, with reference both to the Roman and the Canon law. The difficulties proved too great, and he chose to make Osse's document the vehicle of some of his ideas. His notes on the text number 271. The Testament itself contains only 118 sections. Although the notes are in much smaller type than the text, a rough estimate shows that they fill, in the aggregate, about one-half the whole space. If we should fully analyze both text and notes, we should find in them two separate monuments, of two stadia of development in political philosophy, previous to that marked by the most complete form of cameralism. For that reason we shall not undertake here a detailed account either of Osse or of Thoma-sius. Their determining purpose was not identical with that of cameralism proper. On the whole, they had their center in other groups, with which this book does not attempt to deal. We may simply note in these two writers certain germs which must be examined in more developed form in later theorists. One who knew nothing of the history of the German language, or of its geographical variations, who assumed that its growth was in a straight line, and who drew conclusions from literary form alone, would promptly place Osse's Testament much later than Obrecht's Secreta Politica; perhaps even later than Becher. Of course Albion Small, The Cameralists, 36 the use of Latin by the side of German in the Obrecht collection strengthens the impression of age. Osse's syntax, as well as his vocabulary, approaches closer than that of either of these writers to modern usage. According to Thomasius' statement (Vorrede, p. 33), this is not to be attributed to the editor. He says that he changed little or nothing in the style, with the single exception of substituting the word oder in frequent cases for Osse's word aber. Osse's own statement of his reason for writing in German is as follows: The motives which have moved me to set down my opinions in the German language, are not for the sake of His Electoral Grace, who, God be praised, was in his youth thoroughly instructed in the Latin tongue and good arts, but rather the consideration that this memorial might come to the knowledge of laymen, untaught in the Latin language, and the desire that they might not be hindered in reading it by the intermixture of many Latin words. 35 Osse begins the Testament with a paragraph which we translate as closely as possible: It is among all wise people beyond dispute, that every magistracy (Obrigkeit) may prove and make evident its virtue and aptitude in two ways. First, in time of war, through manly deeds, good sagacious projects, and protection of their lands and subjects, second, in time of peace, through ordering and maintaining of good godly righteous government, judiciary, and Policey. 36 For with these two every magistracy should necessarily be adorned and supplied, in order that in every time of war and peace they (sic) may be able well to govern, protect, control and defend their own. Osse then enlarges briefly upon the duties which belong to the ruler in time of war; but he dismisses this side of the case as beyond his competence. As to the other class of duties, he continues (p. 33): As to what concerns the government in times of peace, I will write, as much as God vouchsafes me grace, for He is the ground on which all must be built which is good, and wherever such ground is lacking there follows no permanent building. The author promises to set down truly all that he has observed in the service of five electors of Saxony, the fifth then living. He frequently repeats that he is doing this not of his own motion, but at the command of the elector. We may safely assume that Albion Small, The Cameralists, 37 the passage immediately following represents Osse's fundamental opinions as well as they could be pictured. He says (p. 33): Such a command I am not at liberty to disregard, and for this reason I lay down first of all the following ground. All that I hereafter write will be built upon it. It must also be observed with special diligence. Government over men is such a high, precious and wonderful thing, that no human being, no matter how excellent in understanding, reason and wit, is to be intrusted with exercising it according to his own will, caprice and opinion, for such government is a higher thing than that the exercise of it could belong to one over others who by nature are of one origin with him, which same may be known from all races of animals, since a flock of sheep does not allow itself to be ruled by a sheep, nor a drove of horses or cattle by one of their own kind, but rather for such government something else is necessary, which is higher and better than the other beasts. Now man, who in many ways surpasses the other animals, for the like reason, since man must be governed, he must be governed by something higher and more excellent than man himself, if the government is to be stable. Since now nothing more excellent can be found in this world than man .... who is yet fallible, and has much in common with the beasts, .... and even in case a man were found who could be moved from the right by no irregular affections, he would be subject to mortality, and no one would know what would happen with his successors, therefore almighty God, out of special grace to human kind, has ordained the means of the common written law [der ordentlichen beschriebenen Recht und Gesetze] whereby to keep the temper of magistrates and judges in the right way, in order that the same may govern others and render justice without any hindrance of inordinate inclinations and affections, and when one considers the usefulness of such a divinely given means, one finds that this ordination of rights and laws is one of the highest benefits and gifts with which God has blessed men here in this life, for such laws and rights were in the beginning ordained by wise honorable people after necessary consideration, not from friendship, love or hate, but in general without all inordinate affections and inclinations. .... When now such common right and law is ordained, even if those who act contrary to it are punished in accordance with it, .... no one has occasion for complaint, but everyone is satisfied, since we know that justice has been done to one Albion Small, The Cameralists, 38 as well as to another, and that so impatience and uproar of the subjects is avoided. 37 A little later (p. 37) the conclusion is drawn still more distinctly: Hence follows that it is a human duty to hold the common rights and laws in honor, to esteem them high, and to subject oneself to them with patience, as the means whereby common peace, repose and welfare are maintained. And that also the established magistracy is under obligation to protect such right and law, to enforce it and to govern according to it, not oppressing anyone by acting contrary to it. For there can be no doubt that as the powers that be are ordained of God (Ad. Rom. 13) likewise also human rights and laws by the powers that be, so that they flow from the providence and special destiny of almighty God. .... Accordingly everyone should remember that if he disobeys the magistrate and escapes punishment, yet he is not assured of escaping the punishment of almighty God. 38

We have commenced the library with a translation of Baron d’Holbach’s System of Nature, because it is estimated as one of the most able expositions of theological absurdities which has ever been written. It is in reality a System of Nature. Man is here considered in all his relations both to his own species and those spiritual beings which are supposed to exist in the imaginary Utopia of religious devotees. This great work strikes at the root of all the errours and evil consequences of religious superstition and intolerance. It inculcates the purest morality; instructing us to be kind one to another, in order to live happily in each other’s society — to be tolerant and forbearing, because belief is involuntary, and mankind are so organized that all cannot think alike — to be indulgent and benevolent, because kindness begets kindness, and hence each individual becomes interested for the happiness of every other, and thus all contribute to human felicity. Let those who declare the immorality of sceptical writings, read the System of Nature, and they will be undeceived. They will then learn that the calumniated sceptics are incited by no other motives than the most praiseworthy benevolence; that far from endeavouring to increase that misery which is incidental to human life, they only wish to heal the animosities caused by religious dissensions, and to show men that their true polar star is to be happy, and endeavour to render others so. But above all, let those read this work who seek to come at a “knowledge of the truth;” — let those read it whose minds are harassed by the fear of death, or troubled by the horrible tales of a sanguinary and vengeful God. Let them read this work, and their doubts will vanish if there is any potency in the spear of Ithuriel. If the most profound logic, the acutest discrimination, the keenest and most caustic sarcasm, can reflect credit on an author, then we may justly hail Baron d’Holbach as the greatest among philosophers, and an honour to infidels. He is the author of many celebrated works besides the System of Nature, among which we may number, Good Sense, The Natural History of Superstition, Letters to Eugenia, and other famous publications.

This influential survey synthesizes ancient documents and physical evidence to build an account of religious, family, and civic life of Periclean Athens and Rome during the time of Cicero. In bypassing the body of often-glorified post-Classical histories, it builds an accurate and detailed depiction of Hellenic and Latin urban culture.<br>

Batoche Hegel

The following Lectures were delivered by Lord Acton as Regius Profes- sor of Modern History at Cambridge in the academical years 1895–96, 1896–97, 1897–98, 1898–99. The French Revolution, 1789–95, was in those years one of the special subjects set for the Historical Tripos, and this determined the scope of the course. In addition some discussion of the literature of the Revolution generally took place either in a conver- sation class or as an additional lecture.

This work has been with me a labor of love. The gathering of materials for it, and the writing of it, as carrying me into what I feel to be interesting scenes, have afforded me great pleasure, which is the only reward I am likely to get. I publish it, as the last, and to me the only remaining, means of testifying my regard for my country-loved all the more because I am now far from it-and my country's philosophy, which has been the means of stimulating thought in so many of Scotland's sons. The English-speaking public, British and American, has of late been listening to divers forms of philosophy,-to Coleridge, to Kant, to Cousin, to Hegel, to Comte, to Berkeley,-and is now inclined to a materialistic psychology. Not finding permanent satisfaction in any of these, it is surely possible that it may grant a hearing to the sober philosophy of Scotland. M. Cousin has remarked that the philosophy of Scotland is part of the history of the country. I have treated it as such; and I claim to have one qualification for the work: I am in thorough sympathy with the characteristic sentiments of my native land. I have farther tried to make my work a contribution to what may be regarded as a new department of science, the history of thought, which is quite as important as the history of wars, of commerce, of literature, or of civilization. Some of these articles have appeared in the "North British Review," the "British and Foreign Evangelical Review," and the "Dublin University Magazine;" but the greater number are now given to the public for the first time, and all of them have been rewritten.

A pioneering work in psychology, this enormously influential book served as a catalyst in the study of the foundations of social behavior. Ironically, its approach marked such a dramatic departure from contemporary trends that it stimulated little follow-up research at the time of its 1908 publication. In recent years, however, the author's ideas have been resurrected in sociobiological reasoning, making the republication of this systematic treatise particularly timely. McDougall's work grounds social behavior in biology, focusing on the individual and attributing most social behavior to instinct. This reasoning makes his work one of the first in modern psychology to take human motivation as its central concern. As one of the initial texts of social psychology, it assisted in laying the foundations of a new discipline, separating the field from its forerunners, sociology and general psychology. McDougall's emphasis on the instinctive basis of social phenomena also helped promote the individualistic approach typical of modern social psychology. Popular, long-lived, and ever-relevant, this landmark work is guaranteed a wide audience among teachers and students of psychology.

Of Laws in Relation to Commerce, Considered in its Nature and to human nature as well as to the great abilities of the author. The wisest and most learned man, and those most distinguished by birth and the elevation of their stations, have, in every country in Europe, considered it as a most excellent performance. And may we be permitted to add, that a sovereign prince 1 as justly celebrated for his probity and good sense, as for his political and military skill, has declared that from M. de Montesquieu he has learnt the art of government. But had the illustrious author received no such distinguished honour, the numerous editions of this work in French, and their sudden spreading through all Europe, are a sufficient testimony of the high esteem with which it has been received by the public. But notwithstanding the deserved applause which has been so liberally bestowed on the author, there have been some who have not only endeavoured to blast his laurels, but have treated him with all that scurrility which bigotry and superstition are apt, on every occasion, to throw out against truth, reason and good sense. These M. de Montesquieu has himself answered, in a separate treatise intitled, A Defense of the Spirit of Laws, from whence we have thought proper to extract, for the sake of such as have not seen that treatise, the principal of those objections, and the substance of what has been given in reply: Only first observing, that this defense is divided into three parts, in the first of which he answers the general reproaches that have been thrown out against him; in the second he replies to particular reproaches; and in the third, he gives some reflections on the manner in which his work has been criticized. The author first complains of his being charged both with espousing the doctrines of Spinoza, and with being a Deist, two opinions directly contradictory to each other. To the former of these he answers, by placing in one view the several passages in the Spirit of Laws directly levelled against the doctrines of Spinoza; and then he replies to the objections that have been made to those passages, upon which this injurious charge is founded. ## ' &( In an aristocracy the supreme power is lodged in the hands of a certain number of persons. These are invested both with the legislative and executive authority; and the rest of the people are, in respect to them, the same as the subjects of a monarchy in regard to the sovereign. They do not vote here by lot, for this would be productive of inconveniences only. And indeed, in a government where the most mortifying distinctions are already established, though they were to be chosen by lot, still they would not cease to be odious; it is the nobleman they envy, and not the magistrate. When the nobility are numerous, there must be a senate to regulate the affairs which the body of the nobles are incapable of deciding, and to prepare others for their decision. In this case it may be said that the aristocracy is in 22. Tournefort, Voyages. 23. At Lucca the magistrates are chosen only for two months. 24. Diodorus, xviii, p. 601, ed. Rhodoman. 25. Ferdinand, king of Aragon, made himself grand master of the orders, and that alone changed the constitution. 26. The Eastern kings are never without vizirs, says Sir John Chardin. ## ' #( There is no great share of probity necessary to support a monarchical or despotic government. The force of laws in one, and the prince's arm in the other, are sufficient to direct and maintain the whole. But in a popular state, one spring more is necessary, namely, virtue. ## * ( As virtue is necessary in a popular government, it is requisite also in an aristocracy. True it is that in the latter it is not so absolutely requisite. The people, who in respect to the nobility are the same as the subjects with regard to a monarch, are restrained by their laws. They have, therefore, less occasion for virtue than the people in a democracy. But how are the nobility to be restrained? They who are to execute the laws against their colleagues will immediately perceive that they are acting against themselves. Virtue is therefore necessary in this body, from the very nature of the constitution. An aristocratic government has an inherent vigour, unknown to democracy. The nobles form a body, who by their prerogative, and for their own particular interest, restrain the people; it is sufficient that there are laws in being to see them executed. But easy as it may be for the body of the nobles to restrain the people, it is difficult to restrain themselves. 8 Such is the nature of this constitution, that it seems to subject the very same persons to the power of the laws, and at the same time to exempt them. Now such a body as this can restrain itself only in two ways; either by a very eminent virtue, which puts the nobility in some measure on a level with the people, and may be the means of forming a great republic; or by an inferior virtue, which puts them at least upon a level with one another, and upon this their preservation depends. Moderation is therefore the very soul of this government; a moderation, I mean, founded on virtue, not that which proceeds from indolence and pusillanimity. ## ,.&+! In monarchies, policy effects great things with as little virtue as possible. Thus in the nicest machines, art has reduced the number of movements, springs, and wheels. The state subsists independently of the love of our country, of the thirst of true glory, of self-denial, of the sacrifice of our dearest interests, and of all those heroic virtues which we admire in the ancients, and to us are known only by 1. This is a very important distinction, whence I shall draw many consequences; for it is the key of an infinite number of laws. 2. Cromwell. 3.

Title page ......Page 1 Contents......Page 3 PREFACE......Page 5 LECTURE I: Introductory......Page 6 LECTURE II: The Conciliar Movement and the Papalist Reaction......Page 28 LECTURE III: Luther and Machiavelli......Page 45 LECTURE IV: The Politiques and Religious Toleration......Page 73 LECTURE V: The Monarchomachi......Page 89 LECTURE VI: The Jesuits......Page 110 LECTURE VII: The Netherlands Revolt......Page 125 NOTES......Page 143

Translator's Introduction......Page 7 Charles Hegel's Preface......Page 13 Introduction......Page 16 The Oriental World......Page 130 China......Page 134 India......Page 158 India: Buddhism......Page 187 Persia......Page 193 Zend People......Page 196 Assyrians......Page 202 Persian Empire......Page 208 The Greek World......Page 245 Greek Spirit......Page 247 Subjective Work of Art......Page 260 Objective Work of Art......Page 263 Political Work of Art......Page 270 Fall of the Greek Spirit......Page 296 The Roman World......Page 298 Elements of the Roman Spirit......Page 303 History of Rome to the Second Punic War......Page 316 Rome from Second Punic War to the Emperors......Page 326 Rome Under the Emperors......Page 334 Christianity......Page 339 Bysantine Empire......Page 355 The German World......Page 360 Barbarian Migrations......Page 366 Mohametanism......Page 374 Empire of Charlemagne......Page 379 Feudality and Hierarchy......Page 385 Crusades......Page 409 Transition from Feudalism to Monarchy......Page 419 The Modern Time......Page 432 Reformation......Page 433 Influence of Reformation on Political Development......Page 448 Éclaircissement and Revolution......Page 460 Notes......Page 479

(Psychologie des Foules) The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind, by French social theorist Gustave Le Bon, is a short treatise written in 1895 on the principles of large gatherings of people. As the disclaimer on the title page notes, the ideas in Le Bon's book were popular at the time of the late 19th century but are no longer in vogue today. The reasons for this are obvious, as LeBon unpretentiously puts to fault all the rhetoric about "democracy," "equality," "fraternity," and "equality" as being mere catchphrases that self-serving demagogues use to control the spirit of the masses. He cites the French Revolution and the demands of Socialism and Communism during his time. Le Bon outlines the way crowds tend to think (in vivid images illogically connected), how they reason (they don't for all practical purposes), how they express exaggerated emotion, how they are very quick to take action without coherent thought and of the general extreme-conservatism and intolerance of crowds. The individual who becomes part of a crowd tends to loose himself, and feels invincible as he is aware of the similarity of mind and purpose of all those surrounding him. In the book, Le Bon claims that there are several characteristics of crowd psychology: "impulsiveness, irritability, incapacity to reason, the absence of judgement of the critical spirit, the exaggeration of sentiments, and others..." Le Bon claimed that "an individual immersed for some length of time in a crowd soon finds himself – either in consequence of magnetic influence given out by the crowd or from some other cause of which we are ignorant – in a special state, which much resembles the state of fascination in which the hypnotized individual finds himself in the hands of the hypnotizer."Le Bon notes how individuals become unthinking entities of the Herd, and can be unconsciously made to do acts, which can either be of great criminality or heroism. The reasoning of the solitary individual is superior to that of a crowd which has no individuality. All are "equal" in a crowd where, for instance, a mathematician is caught up in the same spirit as a laborer and class and intelligence differences fall to the lowest common denominator. One advantage of crowds is that they can express the spirit of a class, caste, or race of a people better than the individual can, and that crowds are capable of great deeds such as victory in a war or the spread of a religion that would be beyond simply one person's effort. Hitler, Mussolini in addition to Freud, were familiar with LeBon's work, and it is readily apparent that their followers acted very similar to the behavior that LeBon describes.Table of contents Introduction: The Era of the Crowds.Book I: The Mind of Crowds Chapter I: General Characteristics of Crowds—Psychological Law of Their Mental Unity Chapter II: The Sentiments and Morality of Crowds Chapter III: The Ideas, Reasoning Power, and Imagination of Crowds Chapter IV: A Religious Shape Assumed By All the Convictions of CrowdsBook II: The Opinions and Beliefs of Crowds Chapter I: Remote Factors of the Opinions and Beliefs of Crowds Chapter II: The Immediate Factors of the Opinions of Crowds Chapter III: The Leaders of Crowds and Their Means of Persuasion Chapter IV: Limitations of the Variability of the Beliefs and Opinions of CrowdsBook III: The Classification and Description of the Different Kinds of Crowds Chapter I: The Classification of Crowds Chapter II: Crowds Termed Criminal Crowds Chapter III: Criminal Juries Chapter IV: Electoral Crowds Chapter V: Parliamentary Assemblies

Volume 1 of 2. These volumes are not a close translation of Auguste Comte's original work. It is a very free translation. It is more a condensation than an abridgment. The object was to convey the meaning of the original in the cleverest way possible; and to this all other considerations were made to yield. Whichever way we look over the whole field of science, we see the truths and ideas presented by Comte cropping out from the surface, and recognized as the foundation of all that is systematic in our knowledge.

Passenger fares seem to us to have been very low. Passengers however appear to have been responsible for their own sustenance, the quarters were probably far from luxurious and of course loss of life by shipwreck unlike loss of freight entailed no financial loss to the carrier. -from "Chapter XVI: Commerce" In this classic work-an expansion of an earlier 1920 edition-a respected classical scholar sketches the economic life of the Roman culture through the republican period and into the fourth century of the empire. Though later books unfairly supplanted it, this volume remains an excellent introduction to the capital, commerce, labor, and industry of the immediate forerunner of modern civilization. In clear, readable language, Frank explores: .agriculture in early Latium .the rise of the peasantry .Roman coinage .finance and politics .the "plebs urbana" .the beginnings of serfdom .and much more. American historian TENNEY FRANK (1876-1939) was professor of Latin at Bryn Mawr College and Johns Hopkins University, and also wrote Roman Imperialism (1914) and A History of Rome (1923).

This scarce antiquarian book is a facsimile reprint of the original. Due to its age, it may contain imperfections such as marks, notations, marginalia and flawed pages. Because we believe this work is culturally important, we have made it available as part of our commitment for protecting, preserving, and promoting the world's literature in affordable, high quality, modern editions that are true to the original work.

Volume 1 of 2. These volumes are not a close translation of Auguste Comte's original work. It is a very free translation. It is more a condensation than an abridgment. The object was to convey the meaning of the original in the cleverest way possible; and to this all other considerations were made to yield. Whichever way we look over the whole field of science, we see the truths and ideas presented by Comte cropping out from the surface, and recognized as the foundation of all that is systematic in our knowledge.

In this 1896 work, Cambridge philosopher McTaggart investigates the nature and purpose of Hegel's teaching on dialectic. What is the nature of dialectic according to Hegel? And what is achieved by its means? These are the main questions that John McTaggart (1866–1925) seeks to answer in this work, first published in 1896. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Cambridge-educated philosopher and fellow of Trinity College enjoyed a prominent position within the circle of idealist philosophers, and was regarded as one of England's leading Hegel scholars. Although a proponent of the German philosopher's dialectical thinking in general, McTaggart was not uncritical of Hegel's philosophy and objected to his application of abstract thought. In this work, McTaggart not only gives the reader a thorough introduction to Hegel's understanding of the dialectic method but also exposes a number of points on which he considers Hegel's teaching to be inaccurate: one of these is Hegel's insistence that evil is merely a delusion. **John McTaggart Ellis McTaggart** FBA was an English idealist metaphysician. For most of his life McTaggart was a fellow and lecturer in philosophy at Trinity College, Cambridge. He was an exponent of the philosophy of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and among the most notable of the British idealists.

Hegel Batoche

...: Authorised English Translation From the Sixth German Edition

Batoche Books, Kitchener, 1999. — 191 p. Table of Contents The grounds of Political Obligation. Spinoza. Hobbes. Locke. Russeau. Sovereignty and the General Will. Will, Not Force, Is the Basis of the State. Has the Citizen Rights Against the State? Private Rights, the Right to Life and Liberty. The Right of the State Over the Individual in War. The Right of the State to Punish. The Right of the State to Promote Morality. The Right of the State in Regard to Property. The Right of the State in Regard to the Family.